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I do not reproach the Russians for being what they are,  
what I blame in them is their pretending  to be what we are 
Marquis de Custine, Empire of the Czar:  
A Journey Through Eternal Russia, 1839  
 
Being an educated and noble Frenchman, Marquis de Custine could easily justify his judgements and vision of what 
Europeanness really was and how it looked like. In the nineteenth century European mirror of Otherness, Russia's 
geographical image merged with the domain of Eastern backward lands excluded by philosophic geography from Europe 
proper and shifted to Asia. Produced within the strategic discourse, focussed on the Eastern question, and accompanied by 
the fundamental division of Europe between the culturally superior West and the inferior East, the theme of the "Asiatic 
barbarian at the gates of Europe" dominated the European constructions of Russia for almost two centuries. Given the 
self-sufficient character of such an attitude, there was no necessity of identifying of what Russianness precisely meant in 
terms of self-perception and mentality. 
It was the twentieth century Europe's construction of Other, with the military ingredient of the Cold War discourse and 
Kulturkamf, that incorporated scholarly interpretations of the Russia's enigmatic image i. A lot of historical factors 
propelled the interest in Russian philosophy and social sciences. Yet this first serious encounter proved to be complicated 
for western scholars who, in some cases, could not guard themselves against temptation to revive the theme of the 
"irrational barbarian". However, in this sense, their motivation is not completely unreasonable. 
As Vasiliy Zen'kovsky noticed once, "Russian thought was entirely historiosophic", and "this exclusive and excessive 
attention to philosophy of history [in Russia], of course, was not accidental; obviously, it was rooted in those spiritual 
precepts that went from the Russian past, from national peculiarities of the "Russian soul"ii.  
Russian historiosophy became a point of particular difficulty for western interpreters, for they encountered here with 
the knotty and complex material, especially in the cases when ideological, political, and cultural-historical views of some 
thinkers constituted a complex, but cohesive 'melting pot' where policy proposals were mixed with purely philosophical 
comprehension of the world history, ontology and epistemology of natural sciences; positive knowledge and 
phenomenological mode of thinking coexisted with religious beliefs and permeated the whole frame of a world-view; 
where existential experience realized itself in such a way that the whole Weltanschauung acquired tragic and remarkably 
pessimistic features. This pattern of thought-style is characteristic of the Russian nineteenth-century conservative 
philosophical tradition, and of N. Danilevsky's and K. Leontiev's historiosophies particularly.   
 Naturally, the conservative views of these philosophers had been variously interpreted. At least three basic western 
historiographical lines of interpretation, which emphasized respectively the cultural, psychological and political context, 
can be identified:  
a) conceptualization within the frame of the conservative romanticism and Slavophile tradition; 
b) socio-psychological interpretations; 
c) perception of Danilevsky's and Leontiev's views through the ideological prism of pan-Slavist tradition of the second 
half of the nineteenth century. 
In the first case, the socio-cultural contextualization of the historiosophical concepts within the scheme of the 
disintegration of the Slavophile utopian conservative Weltanschauung, undoubtedly, represented one of the most 
successful efforts at historical interpretation.iii Conceiving the term Weltanschauung as a kind of structurally unified and 
coherent mental construct (thought-style) distinguished from the empirical intellectual constructions, or ideologies of other 
social groups, A.Walicki the interpreted Russian nineteenth century conservative tradition as a specific historical romantic 
world-view that emerged in response to the challenges of modernity and the values of bourgeois liberalism and 
rationalism. A.Walicki lifted Leontiev's sociology and Danilevsky's historiosophy from the Slavophile conservative 
paradigm and ascribed their intellectual originality to the processes of the disintegration of Slavophilism in the 1870-80s 
that finally was superseded by a socio-political ideology of Pan-Slavism "seeking to achieve particular and limited aims 
and tending more and more to subordinate principles to practical considerations." iv The idea of the 'marginal' and 
'transitionary' status of Danilevsky's and Leontiev's historical views belonged to Walicki's later interpretation; the earlier 
one, represented in History of Russian Thought (1980), v methodologically resembled the approaches of the Soviet 
Marxist historians. Following the principles of the latter, Walicki placed critically historiosophical constructions of both 
thinkers into the social context of the epoch and then assessed them as 'reactionary' objectively and subjectively, as 
reactionary in content as well as in function (in situational sense.) In The Slavophile Controversy (1985), the term 
'reactionary' has been replaced by cultural definitions, whereas the concepts of Danilevsky and Leontiev acquired mainly 
cultural meaning and dimension as the intermediate links in the process of the disintegration of the Slavophile world-view 
and its autonomization in the form of political ideology. According to Walicki, Leontiev and Danilevsky were the first 
amongst Russian thinkers who 'distorted' the core of the Slavophile doctrine by shifting the interests from cultural and 
religious to political issues and identifying the needs of the state with nationalism, pan-Slavism, or 
 
interest in the Slavonic nations as carriers of superior moral principles ... and interest in Slavonic lands as a possible 
testing-ground for the Slavophile utopia ... gradually became narrowed down into speculation concerned only with 
the interests of Russia as a great power.vi 
 
The unique systematic exposition of this transformation was Danilevsky's Russia and Europe. Its author, as Walicki 
admitted, undertook a complete revision of the Slavophile doctrine through rejecting universal values of the 'true 
Christianity’ and substituting a glorified notion of statehood. Walicki uncovered a second, hidden shift in perspectives, 
namely, Danilevsky's differentiation of the spheres of competence of the 'individual' and 'national', 'statist'. This 
justification of Machiavellian approach allowed Danilevsky supposedly to preach on openly cynical attitude to 
international alliances.vii  
According to Walicki, ideological divergence, however, did not constitute the peculiar features of Danilevsky's 
historiosophy. Rather its distinctiveness was primarily concentrated in the theory of 'cultural-historical types'. Walicki 
brilliantly traced the influences and sources that stood behind it. Like G.Florovsky in Russian historiography,viii he 
located the elements of Danilevsky's notions in A.Grigoriev's (1822–1864) romantic Schellingian aestheticism that 
identified the nations with the homogeneous organisms governed by their own necessities and specific laws of 
development, as a kind of critique of Hegelian 'instrumentalism' and its universal laws of evolution. The typal theory, 
elaborated by N.Danilevsky, not only followed this tradition, but also integrated the cyclical conception of historical time 
developed by I.Kireevsky. Undoubtedly, the main categories in such theories were supplied by a morphological point of 
viewix. The difference in Danilevsky's scheme was to replace aesthetic criteria with naturalistic ones.  
Trying to interpret Danilevsky's version of Russian messianism in terms of Pan-Slavist tendencies, Walicki severed the 
notion of 'necessity' from the context of the civilizational approach and treated the 'messianism' in Russia and Europe as 
the conscious primary task, that is, voluntaristic policy. By doing this, he overlooked the serious role of morphological 
evolution of 'cultural types'. Messianic aims are not to be achieved by means of political activity, they are determined by 
the logic of civilizational development, according to Danilevsky. Yet such an underestimation of the underlying 
determinism in Russia and Europe is not the result of misunderstanding; it was Danilevsky himself who fell into the trap of 
assigning the priority to the historically predetermined necessity in his historiosophical conceptualization.[I]  
Pan-Slavist utopism had been that very ground that connected Danilevsky's theory of cultural types with 
ultra-conservative romanticism of K.Leontiev, "the most original individual personality among extreme reactionaries of 
the reign of Alexander III," or "the last uncompromising defender of Russian, Western European . . . feudalism."x  
Walicki picked out the appropriate 'key' concept in his interpretation, namely Leontiev's aristocratic aestheticism 
which is revealed in individuality; its prerequisite was "differentiation and therefore inequality"xi as the main criterion of 
the perception of history. It is reasonably that such liberal ideals as 'rational middle class happiness', the ‘average man’, 
‘universal progress’ did not fit it and, moreover, became extremely alien to Leontiev's convictions. Obviously this 
aesthetic vision of the value of divergence also affected his theory of evolution of social organisms. 
Having been Danilevsky's disciple, Leontiev, nevertheless, was as far from Pan-Slavists, as he was from Slavophiles. 
He was strongly opposed to the 'ecclesiastical democratism' of A.Khomiakov and to the Slavophile criticism of feudalism 
and Western aristocracy. Evidently, Walicki shared N.Berdiaev's belief that neo-Byzantinism of Leontiev's historiosophy 
represented the diametrical opposite of the Slavophile doctrine: 
 
A cursory examination of Leontiev's views suffices to show that he was not a Slavophile in either the historical or the 
etymological meaning of the term.xii[II]  
 
In general terms, the philosophy of history of both thinkers fits Walicki's mould of the conservative romanticism of the 
Russian nobility, founding its most original expression in Moscow Slavophilism in the 1840s.  
Walicki was not the only proponent of the idea of the 'disintegrated' Slavophilism, first applied in historiography by 
P.Miliukov;xiii T.Masaryk used the same scheme, perceiving the theory of the cultural types as the expression of the later 
Slavophile 'biological' messianism: 
 
Danilevsky instilled a few valuable drops of zoology of biologically based nationalism into the Slavophile 
philosophy of history. From biological nationalism it is but a step to biological patriotism to which many of the later 
Slavophiles succumbed.xiv 
 
Masaryk attributed Danilevsky's notions of a decaying civilization to an earlier formulation implicit in Rousseau and 
Herder; what remained authentic is an entirely 'inadequate anthropological content' of Danilevsky's views (the definition 
of race, relations between race and nationality, racial classification.)xv 
E.Thaden also accepted the idea of the disintegration, although in a modified form. The point of his departure was the 
mingling of Russian traditional nationalism, originated in the fourteenth century, with romantic conservatism and 
historicism with its "emphasis on the fundamental irrationality of reality, on national individuality, and on organic 
historical development," xvi  that is concepts of Eutwicklungsgedanke and Volkstumlichkeit. The result of such an 
integration in the mid nineteenth century in Russia Thaden called conservative nationalism. This term embraced a set of 
different Weltanschauungen of the later Slavophiles, pochvenniki, and pan-Slavists. Thaden associated Danilevsky's views 
with the flourishing phase of the tradition, and in terms of inspiration with pochvennichestvo of M.Dostoevsky, 
N.Strakhov and A.Grigoriev. Konstantin Leontiev parted company with K.Pobedonostsev and R.Fadeev in the 1880-90s 
when the nationalist theories fell into the stage of disintegration, when, according to Thaden, it became difficult "to apply 
the idealistic and humanitarian conceptions of Russian nationality to the concrete problems of Russian society."
xviii
xvii While 
distinguishing two basic characteristics of Danilevsky's world of ideas, "his belief in the fundamental unity of things in 
nature and society as well as within the individual categories of the biological sciences; and his constant search for a 
system of laws that governed the development and existence of the phenomena of the external world,"  Thaden 
defined the philosopher's originality as an effort to apply to history methodology of natural sciences. Through the 
influence of Karl Ernst von Baer, "Danilevsky became imbued with the spirit of German romanticism and idealism as 
applied to biology."xix The conception of birth and decay in history of civilizations, as it was represented in Russia and 
Europe, "is certainly suggestive of the influence of the morphological and organic interpretation of history and biology so 
common among German scholars" convinced that "the ages of man were to be reviewed as a 'historical sequence' from 
conception to death."xx  
Being projected onto the realm of social sciences, Danilevsky's idea of the individual and incommensurable units in 
historical development, as Thaden pointed out, had ambiguously negative implications, such as justification of hostility 
between civilizational types by references to analogy in the world of the natural phenomena, and importantly, "the failure 
to give fairly acceptable and convincing characterizations of the spiritual principles of his ten civilizations," which 
according to the laws of their development had to be coherent in terms of language and nationality. The biological concept 
of development, suggested by Danilevsky, implied the cultural homogeneity of the civilizational principle, but in historical 
reality, for instance 
 
ancient Semitic civilization . . . was originally developed by the non-Semitic Sumerians, whose agglutinative 
language was radically and fundamentally different from Assyrian, Babylonian, Babylonian, Phoenician,. . . and 
western European civilization has included peoples speaking such diverse languages as Norwegian, . . . Polish, 
Croatian and Slovenian.xxi[III]  
 
Leontiev's historiosophy also embedded the influence of the natural sciences, however 
 
the differences separating Leontiev's from Danilevsky and other conservative nationalists were just as striking as the 
similarities linked him to them. For one thing, Leontiev was the first Russian conservative thinker who fully realized 
the inherent difficulty involved in any attempt to combine modern nationalism with traditional Eastern Europe and 
Muscovite civilization.xxii 
 
The understanding of the dilemma of modernization added to Leontiev's conception of history and his life remarkably 
pessimistic tones and finally made him accept the subjectively aesthetic interpretation of Byzantine cultural tradition. 
Iver Neumann introduced the similar concept of 'romantic nationalism' in Russia and the Idea of Europe (1996), 
treating it as a constantly modified element in the process of constituting 'Other' throughout Russia's modern and 
contemporary history. According to his scheme, in the 1860-80s, after the military defeat and national humiliation in the 
Crimean War, the 'classical' (Slavophile) romantic nationalist position essentially radicalized towards 'revanchist' 
programme of pan-Slavism and turned away from Kireevsky's doctrine of the superior spirituality. The new ideological 
movement sustained the need to restore national pride by means of revenge, or gathering the Slav lands under the imperial 
tutelage; Danilevsky "brought a positivist, classificatory language"xxiii to this messianic aim and . . . excluded Europe 
from humanity, substituting the latter as a non-existent entity for the single Slavic cultural type as the only historical 
reality that was about to take the place of decaying Romano-German civilization. The nation-states as actors in 
international relations were subordinated to the notion of 'type', turned its particular embodiments. In terms of social 
psychology, Danilevsky's historiosophy, Neumann emphasized, was rather an intellectualized response typical for those 
human collectives which perceived themselves to be inferior to an out-group and responded to that situation by shifting 
the ground of comparison.xxiv  
Whereas Danilevsky remained under the strong influence of positivism, Leontiev operated within the organicist 
paradigm and Dostoevsky's Christian framework.  
 
Leontiev's understanding of organic nation appeared to be completely different from that one of the Slavophiles. To 
him, the idea which god has inscribed on each nation is of the essence, and the nation itself is merely a container for 
the idea. Russia was chosen to embody the Byzantine idea, where each estate's position is fixed irrevocably and each 
estate is thoroughly different from other. His concept of the nation is thus closer to the one inherent in official 
nationality than that of any other romantic nationalist.xxv 
 
Yet neither E.Thaden nor I.Neumann considered seriously the existential and philosophical layer as a possible point of 
departure in interpretations; for them it played a supplementary role, for the main focuses of their inquiries concentrated 
primarily on ideological aspects.  
Bridging the gap between heterogeneous levels of sociability was the main goal of the researchers who elucidated the 
psychological and existential meaning that ideology had for its own creator and traced the links between the components 
of the ideology in his mind.  
Following this analysis, S.Lukashevich transferred the focus to the socio-psychological motivation of Leontiev's 
historiosophy and separated its dominant constituent, 'heroic vitalism', IV] "a faith, a dynamic Weltanschauung"[ xxvi born 
in existential despair. 
 
It despises all optimistic systems. But it respects the facts and the masters of fact, and thereby surpasses pessimism. It 
is less a science of biology than a religion of metabiology, a religion of dionysian life and energy. Its roots are in the 
classical sociology of the Greeks, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, a sociology which regards society as a vital 
organism which compares culture to harmonious music, a human body, a ship, or a cosmic system.xxvii 
 
In this view, a sort of existential frustration composed hidden layers of Leontiev's motivation that informed his 
historiosophy, sociology and the theory of state. Objectively, being concerned with the problem of social survival, 
Leontiev directed his ideology towards "an intellectual justification of the past, a condemnation of the present and a 
blueprint for a future which would restore the gentry (Leontiev's social stratum) to their glory."xxviii Subjectively, the 
problem of social mobility was added to the problems of his personal salvation and reconciliation of his maternal symbols, 
as the personification of his mother — Fear, Love, Aesthetics and Ultra-Conservatism — with religion. The 'ideational 
reconciliation' of the subjective and objective elements of motivation, according to S.Lukashevich, "yielded the key to the 
inner logic of Leontiev's thinking"xxix which was a product of  
 
a dialectical struggle between 'reactionary aesthetics' and 'reactionary' love-dispensing religion based on fear. 
Leontiev had to prove, therefore, that the reactionary state he was advocating was the best guarantee for personal 
salvation.xxx  
 
In ideological and historiosophical terms this meant justification of Byzantinism and the primacy of the state over the 
rights of an individual. 
In the biographical study of Leontiev's ideas, George Ivask
xxxii
xxxiii
xxxiv
xxxi relied upon the same psychological factors, however, 
refusing to introduce any 'behavioural' explanatory concept. He found that Leontiev's historiosophical approaches derived 
intuitive insights from biological medical studies. "Methodologically, he was no less a determinist and materialist than 
Marx; but contrary to the author of The Capital, he departed not from economical factors, but from biological ones; and 
here he stands closer to H.Spencer"  in equalizing the laws of natural and social morphology. Leontiev's conservatism 
is a vague term; "as a liberal-optimist he believed in the neverendless organic development, the dynamics of vital 
processes, whereas as an aesthetician-pessimist he shared the views that one could find in his hypothesis of entropy in 
history."  This ambivalence evidenced the break with the Christian philosophy of history. As an original and lonely 
thinker, Leontiev rather belonged to that 'great nineteenth-century counter-revolution' that "defended quality against 
quantity, the spirit against the matter, . . . nature against technicism, creativity against plutocracy, art against mass media. 
Goethe, Nietzsche, Joseph de Maistre, Carlyle, Donoso . . . took part in this counter-revolution as well."  Leontiev 
contributed to the nineteenth century conservatism existentially. What stood behind his political sociology and 
historiosophy is "always one and the same reality: beauty of life, which he defended more vigorously than other political 
projects . . . The only lesson he could give us is the art of life . . . ."xxxv[V]  
R.E.MacMaster xxxvi
xxxvii xxxviii
xxxix
 interpreted historiosophical insights of Russia and Europe as a product of Ressentiment 
(existential hatred) and the inner conflict between modernist and traditionalist tendencies within the mind of Danilevsky 
who experienced a kind of existential tragedy, being arrested as a member of Petrashevskian society and accused of 
anti-governmental activity. Psychologically, his typal theory, MacMaster argues, was "sublimated expression of his anger 
at himself; it allowed him to view his problems as external and general to his country and his time, rather than as internal 
and specific himself . . . ."  In philosophical terms, Danilevsky's 'aggressive impulses of self-repression'  and 
self-denial pushed him to the border of the metaphysical totalitarian thinking. The true aim of Russia and Europe was 
neither the personal, nor the national, but the universal salvation and solution of the "metaphysical problem of man's 
alienation of God, nature, his fellows and himself"  through the forceful political measures, a 'liturgy of 
destruction'. xl  Thus, according to MacMaster, a Russian utopian socialist transformed himself into a radical left 
'totalitarian metaphysician'. xli From the socio-psychological point of view, Danilevsky's doctrine was shaped in the 
struggle between  
 
modern secular scientific culture and more tradition-oriented, sacramental culture, when a lonely man attempts to 
maintain the temper of the latter in the language of the former; when there is advocated the use of modern means to 
traditional ends; when such practice is regarded as providential or necessary.xlii 
 
Danilevsky's theory, as a totalitarian response to the challenges of modernity, was overfilled with 'repressed feelings of 
vengefulness';xliii MacMaster argued, it was rather amateurish and very ordinary intellectual blend of  
 
angry, dated political pan-Slavist journalism, primitive . . . social science, Realpolitik, sentimental romanticism and 
populist utopian socialism, fanciful theology and philosophy of history and mad prophesy,xliv 
 
a doctrine "typologically similar to the ideas of forerunners of Stalin and Hitler."xlv  
Amongst western scholars, R.MacMaster was the only who perceived Danilevsky as a left socialist radical and denied 
linear descent from the Slavophiles to the totalitarianism of Russia and Europe.  
Needless to say, such an assertion as a whole is evidently subjective and tendentious. It entirely relies upon the 
exaggeration of Danilevsky's radicalism (a critique from the side of the liberals testifies the pro-conservative and 
non-socialist character of his philosophy; besides Danilevsky himself considered a Petrashevskian period in his life as a 
critical
xlvii VI] could hardly adequately comprehend the main themes of the Russian idealist philosophy. The 
arguments in favour of 'totalitarian and Bolshevik twists' of Dostoevsky, Soloviev, Danilevsky, or Berdiaevxlviii
xlvi ) and misunderstanding of the Russian nineteenth-century philosophical tradition. Being too vague and 
ideologically motivated at the same time, such terms as 'philosophical totalitarianism' and 'metaphysical 
radicalism' [
  look 
really curious and made MacMaster's interpretation and conclusions preconceived and biased.  
The ideologically prejudiced misunderstanding, that partly resulted in making stereotypes, touched upon another 
Danilevsky's magnum opus, Darwinism. A Critical Study. Major scholars studying the influence of Darwinian theories in 
Russian thought, perceived it mainly as an attempt "to illustrate the cultural subjectivity of scientific theories and to warn 
Russians against the importation of alien western values in the guise of positive knowledge." xlix  A.Vuchinich's 
judgement moved further in denying Danilevsky's scientific intentions that  
 
relied upon ideology, translated into selected tenets of morality, as the primary source of criteria for selecting 
arguments and directing analysis. Danilevsky's attack on Darwinism was a special attack on 'nineteenth century 
science materialism' and an elaborate expression of the cosmic mission of Russian culture heralded by Russia and 
Europe . . .l  
 
Thus 'messianic' ambiguities of Danilevsky's earlier work influenced assertions of his scientific studies.  
The trend of socio-political contextualization could give us even more vivid examples that entered directly into the 
field of 'historical mythology'. The favourite themes in the western historiography in 1950-70s, Russian messianism and 
striking 'similarities' between anti-western aspirations of Leontiev and Danilevsky and Stalin's ideology, were not only the 
products of the aberration of historical perspective, but of the ideologically moulded thinking of the Cold War. In this 
sense, Leontiev could hardly be perceived in the other role than in that one of 'reactionary imperialist with a strong 
political will to power,'li whereas Danilevsky as his predecessor had been turned into the precursor of no one else but 
Stalin and his tyranny. 
 
Danilevsky was as deeply convinced as Stalin was seventy five years later that the Russian people pursued ideals 
opposite to the warlike and plutocratic spirit of the West.lii 
Moreover, it appeared that the theory of the cultural types promoted the Cold War (!) ideology already in the 
nineteenth-century. "The messianic fervour, the Sendungsbewusstsein, the expectation of a decisive apocalyptic struggle 
against the alien world," liii were expressed so eloquently by Dostoevsky and Danilevsky as by no one else.liv The 
function of Danilevsky's historiosophical notions was completely pragmatic: "to invest . . . understanding of Russian 
messianism with specific respectability"lv and justify 'Manichean conception of history and adoption of Bismarckian 
Realpolitik. Danilevsky's and Leontiev's Pan-Russianism "complemented the expansive foreign policy of the state under 
the camouflage of Pan-Slavism."lvi[VII]  
H.Kohn
VIII] He refused to see any kind of novelty of Russia and 
Europe in terms of Slavophile ideology, since Danilevsky's doctrine hardly presented new viewpoints beyond those 
professed by Pogodin and Tyutchev. It was rather "the first comprehensive treatise presenting the subject in the 
framework of a general history of civilizations."lviii
lvii in a similar manner considers notions and concepts of N.Danilevsky strictly within the mainstream of 
Russian messianic pan-Slavic thought, which is also regarded as a specific cultural response to the processes of the 
unification of Germany and German imperialistic ideologies.[
 Danilevsky's civilizational approach was reinterpreted version of the 
cyclic theory of successive cultural types, 'invented' by the German historian Heinrich Rückert (1823-1879). Yet Kohn's 
'insight' here is neither original nor important; he simply follows Vl.Soloviev's criticism of the Slavophile theories, and 
accusations of the scientific plagiarism that appeared in Russia and Europe.[IX] 
The scientific 'shell' of the theory of cultural types was of little importance, Kohn argued. What it gave was 'feeling of 
clothing . . . social and cultural observations and . . . predictions of the future with the coat of objective necessity."lix 
More precisely it offered not a picture of reality in its complex texture but a mirror of the emotions, fears and hopes 
animating certain civilizations at given times. Emotional perception (Danilevsky's fear of Germanism) had become the 
starting point of Kohn's interpretation. It explained the emergence of the doctrine of European hostility towards Russia 
and formed the ground for apology of the idea of the peculiar spiritual nature of Slavic civilization. Danilevsky pacified 
his historical fears in the notion of the morphological diversities. Finally it occurred that 
 
European civilization was only a product of history, nothing universal and final; it was as one-sided as other 
civilizations had been and like them subject to the law of growth and decay.lx 
Moreover, peculiar spiritual features of the Slav type, derived from the principle of pacific social organization — the 
original pattern of Rousseau-Herder historiosophical thought lxi — were mixed with traditional Slavophile conviction 
that any attempt to introduce alien western civilizational element would threaten the originality of Slavdom.  
Another, much more important point in Kohn's interpretation is a geopolitical dimension of Danilevsky's 
historiosophy. He notes at least two remarkable facts about Danilevsky's pan-Slavic union. The first, and the most 
conspicuous is that suggested frontiers of the federation as they were depicted in Russia and Europe, realized in 1945, 
after post-war divisions according to the Yalta agreements. The second is that Danilevsky's complaints about the 
Russification of potential allies within the federation and his persistent attempts to prove that Russia will play a positive 
role in the future union by means of emphasizing respective attitude towards their inner autonomy, were later on used 
successfully by Lenin who intended to show that Russia was neither imperialist nor an oppressor. Unfortunately, Kohn 
avoids comments on these coincidences, just trying to compare implicitly pan-Slavic and Marxist doctrines. The 
emergence of the mighty Slavic cultural type through the development of Slavdom reminded him of promises of the ideal 
society which Marx expected at the same time through the development of proletariat. lxii  These comparative 
characteristics are superficial in reality. Apart from the fact that they share the same utopian expectations, whether cultural 
or social, two doctrines differed from each other. More comprehensive explanation in terms of geopolitical units, their 
tendencies and historical weight, had been neglected by Kohn.  
Searching for the similarities in both ideologies, he reduces Russian messianism to the promise of a perfect social 
order in its typically Marxist form. This is nothing but misinterpretation of the notion of 'mono- and multielemental types'. 
The socio-economic foundations were never separated or overestimated in Europe and Russia; pro-Marxist messianic 
social eschatology was entirely alien to Danilevsky. This reason makes it impossible to limit the place of 'cultural types' 
theory by oscillations between pan-Orthodoxism ("the faith in true Christianity as the only source of salvation") and 
pan-Communism ("the faith in the true social doctrine as the only source of salvation"lxiii), as Kohn tries to do. He rather 
substitutes the real for the desirable, as long as pan-Slavism of Danilevsky rejected the Slavophile religious utopianism 
and sacrificed the significance of Orthodoxy. Danilevsky transformed the latter into one of the ingredients of a 'distinct' 
culture or type. "The difference in the cultural principles of the Russian people and the majority of other Slavic people 
from the Germano-Roman peoples consists of the fact," Danilevsky argued, "that the former confess Orthodoxy and the 
latter confess Roman Catholicism or Protestantism."lxiv Certainly, the theory of 'cultural types' promoted neither the 
social messianism nor the religious one; it was much more than an answer to the centralised Germany and 
pan-Germanism; rather it was "a challenge to European civilization based upon an interpretation of history. . . which 
claimed the validity of a universal law."lxv This assertion of Kohn is more accurate. 
P.Christoff
lxvii
lxviii
lxvi brought about a detailed examination of some aspects of Russian Panslavism with an intention of 
pointing out the similarities and differences between ideologies of Moscow Slavophilism and Panslavism in its versions of 
Leontiev and Danilevsky. The general trend was regarded as both cultural and political reaction to Italian and German 
nationalism. It was exactly pan-Germanism of Bismarck and the Drang nach Osten that accompanied the rise of Russian 
messianism. All these national ideologies experienced the same destiny and were, as P.Christoff noticed, synthetic and 
esoteric, and besides, lacked the inspiration and driving force of genuine mass movements.  The ideas they 
respectively promoted (Pan-German empire, all-Slav unity from the Adriatic sea to the Pacific Ocean) never had been a 
historical reality, and that is more characteristic, both "were born of the dreams and fantasies of a handful of 
theoreticians."  While comparing Slavophile and pan-Slavic notions, P.Christoff revealed that the last was also never 
homogeneous. In reality there were different responses to the European political challenges: pan-Slavism, pan-Orthodoxy, 
pan-Russianism, pan-Byzantinism that passed into their own messianisms.lxix The first one, as a mainstream movement, 
was rather a conditional phenomenon, since it manifested itself diversely in a number of individual exponents, having no 
foundations in the form of the complete system of views. From this perspective, Danilevsky's Russia and Europe is not an 
exception. Christoff found its 'originality' in two distinguished features. Danilevsky built up the main concepts by 
concentrating on political context, or by responding to the military and political behaviour of the West, whereas his 
predecessors in the Slavophile milieu responded more characteristically to the western cultural values in general. Thus, 
Christoff summed up, "Danilevsky's pan-Slavism cannot be severed from the powerful wave of pan-Germanism."lxx[X] 
Another 'peculiar difference' is a primarily secular and scientific basis of the theory of cultural types. Obviously, 
Danilevsky, being a natural scientist, had a different mentality and consequently different bias from that of the Slavophiles 
who had not been experienced in physical sciences.
lxxii
lxxi  However this fact gives Christoff a reason to consider 
Danilevsky's theory as purely materialistic despite the fact that he was a believing Orthodox Russian. It is true that his 
view substantially lack the heavy Orthodox 'slant', but one cannot affirm that God does not act in Danilevsky's 'system' of 
types. In Russia and Europe the Deity exposes Himself through the aesthetic and teleological criteria deriving from the 
distinctiveness of civilizational types. 'The need for beauty is the sole spiritual need that matter alone can satisfy," 
Danilevsky wrote, "God desired to create beauty and therefore he created matter."  God is the hidden force of 
historical processes. In its main trends, history, according to Danilevsky, does not develop in correspondence with human 
will, which is able only "to distort or delay temporarily the fulfilment of the plan drawn out by the hand of the Providence, 
but in any case it would be completed in the other, more roundabout ways."lxxiii  
A different explanatory 'model' is used by Christoff in his interpretation of Leontiev's views – the latter were 
withdrawn from the frame of pan-Slavist ideology. What might be emerged from them is "a strong, uncompromising 
Byzantinism and perhaps a somewhat milder Turkism."lxxiv
lxxvi
 Byzantinism, as "a special type . . . of culture, having its 
distinguished marks, its general, clear, sharp comprehensive principles, and its definite consequences in history,lxxv 
represented a complete and well-defined entity, as Christoff pointed out, which had been opposed to the notion of 
Pan-Slavism, Slavianism that meant nothing, but "tribal ethnographic abstraction . . . and idea of common blood and 
similar languages."  
This conclusion seemed to be reasonable, as long as Leontiev himself believed, that there was a lack of cultural values 
in the history of Slavdom and that any kind of unity based exclusively on the principle of soil and blood was unrealistic. It 
was his 'Great Russianism' and 'gentry consciousness', his "profound veneration for an immovable . . . Byzantinism based 
on quasi-religious and quasi-pagan . . . convictions", as Christoff noticed, that made him "remarkably blind and deaf to the 
flow and demands of contemporary life."lxxvii However, such an assumption is not complete; even more, it strives to 
include all the complexities of the exegesis in the single focus. If one would turn it around and concentrate on Leontiev's 
aesthetical perceptions, the picture would look differently: the original source of Byzantinism appeared to be in the 
aesthetics of diversity, in the beauty of historical tragedies. Leontiev's hatred of egalitarian progress and democracy was a 
consequence of the romantic aesthetization of history, a response to the challenging liberal modernization. Besides, 
pan-Byzantinism was not the only component of Leontiev's conservative historiosophy. He assumed that Slavic 
civilization had perspectives to convert itself into Slavic-Asian civilizational type through the absorption of Turanic 
elements, as far as it was important to find the counterweight to the Romano-Germanic cultural type. That is the point 
where Byzantinism is being transformed into Eurasianism as it was later on promoted in the form of the alternative 
national ideology by N.Trubetzkoy and P.Savitsky. P.Christoff missed this key linkage that could explain why Leontiev's 
'narrow and idiosyncratic Byzantinism' pushed him into the isolated intellectual opposition. 
*** 
The major approaches of cultural and socio-political contextualization, reviewed above, have both their deficiencies 
and advantages as well. Such concepts as 'messianic pan-Slavism' , 'conservative romanticism', 'pan
XI] A.Walicki, P.Christoff, 
H.Kohn treat the notions of 'cultural historical types', 'Byzantinism', etc. exclusively as the 'static' ones, as locked up 
within the mainstream of patterns of thought in the nineteenth century. The cultural implications of these patterns that 
shaped Russian national self identification and fitted the channels of the nineteenth century nationalist discourse, have 
been left outside the interpretations.
* -Byzantinism' fixed 
stable ideological characteristics of historiosophical constructions in terms of influences and their inner originality. 
However, the socio-cultural aspect that constitute their essential dynamic elements is missing.[
-
-
 
It is difficult to preserve a balance and trace the links between cultural and ideological layers of such complex 
world-views in the interpretations. Socio-political conceptualization of this phenomenon tended to refine its meaning and 
exaggerate its political and nationalist connotations, and, consequently, to annihilate the cultural context outside and the 
role of cultural (philosophical) components within Danilevsky's and Leontiev's historiosophical constructions. The same 
happened in the case when the conceptual richness of their historiosophies has been reduced to the level of the narrow 
empirical ideologies, being subordinated to the purposes of political conjuncture. 
Indeed, reactionary views of Leontiev, detached from the concepts of 'diversity-in-unity' and organic development, and 
finally his aestheticism, look absurd, incongruous and unlikely. Danilevsky's 'messianic Pan-Slavism', taken out of the 
context of his theory of cultural types and philosophy of organicism, his notion of 'natural identity', could really produce 
the impression of 'totalitarian threat', intensified by means of ideological labelling and reconsidering his views through the 
prism the modern categories applied in twentieth-century European political sciences (!).  
The ideologically motivated comprehension (and understanding) of Russian multi-faceted cultural conservatism and its 
philosophy too easily gives the way to temptations of reductionism and simplified assertions, or simply withdraws them 
from the sphere of humanitarian knowledge and deprives this thought-styles of the right to be authentically rational, 
declaring their "visionary, shamanistic, magical"lxxviii lxxix essence and blind "biological determinism."  
Yet, apart from historiographical 'abuses' and misunderstanding, there was something strikingly similar in the destinies 
of the conservative thinkers, either Russian or European, who combined philosophy of culture, aesthetics, metahistory and 
politics. It was a distinct eschatological stamp of intellectual isolation and sacred martyrdom that sometimes went beyond 
earthly life and became posthumous. 
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